By External Source
Oct 28 2022 – The Horn of Africa is facing its worst drought in 40 years. Scientists suspect that a multi-year La Niña cycle has been amplified by climate change to prolong dry and hot conditions.

After multiple failed harvests and amid high global food prices, the Horn is confronted with a severe food security crisis. Some 37 million people face acute hunger in the region, which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

The biggest differences were that, compared with Somalia, Ethiopia enjoyed a state with more capacity and more political inclusion, and made good use of foreign aid. These are factors that I identify in the book as contributing to how climate change is affecting the security of states. I include famine as a form of insecurity

In Somalia alone, 40% of the population is facing food insecurity: about 6.7 million people. In neighbouring Ethiopia, the proportion is lower – 20% – but the absolute numbers are higher at 20.4 million.

It was not too long ago that drought led to highly divergent impacts between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 2010-2011, a devastating drought led to more than 260,000 deaths beyond normal levels of expected mortality in Somalia. Yet almost no one died in Ethiopia after a severe drought in 2015.

Why did so many people die in Somalia but so few in Ethiopia? I explore these and related questions in my recent book, States and Nature: The Effects of Climate Change on Security.

Using the cases of the two countries, among others, the book shows why Somalia had a famine in the early 2010s while Ethiopia did not, despite both being exposed to severe droughts.

The biggest differences were that, compared with Somalia, Ethiopia enjoyed a state with more capacity and more political inclusion, and made good use of foreign aid. These are factors that I identify in the book as contributing to how climate change is affecting the security of states. I include famine as a form of insecurity.

Better outcomes are expected in states with high capacity to deliver services, high political inclusion where all social groups are represented in government, and where international assistance is welcomed and shared broadly.

Two sets of conditions, two different outcomes

So how did Somalia and Ethiopia stack up on the three factors that contribute to a bad situation being made worse?

In the lead-up to Somalia’s famine in 2011, the country faced persistent problems of a weak national government that was being challenged by Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist militia that controlled significant territory in the south of the country. The Somali government had limited ability to deliver services in the areas it controlled, let alone areas under Al-Shabaab.

For its part, the Ethiopian government invested in social safety net programmes to feed people in the midst of the drought through cash transfers, employment programmes and food assistance.

The issue of sections of the society being excluded was also in greater evidence in Somalia than in Ethiopia. A number of marginalised groups, notably the Bantu Somalis and the Rahanweyn clan, were among the most affected by the drought. Better connected groups diverted aid that otherwise would have benefited these communities.

Finally, Somalia was in much worse shape when it came to aid. Al-Shabaab militants were blocking aid into the country, which led to a number of humanitarian groups withdrawing from Somalia. In addition, the US, through the Patriot Act, discouraged NGOs from providing aid for fear it would end up in Al-Shabaab’s hands. Together, this meant that little humanitarian assistance came into Somalia precisely at the time when the country needed it most. Hundreds of thousands died.

Ethiopia was a favourite of the international community for foreign assistance. It received funds that supported its social safety net programmes, which helped it prepare for the drought and administer emergency aid supplies.

The current food security crisis in the Horn of Africa, however, reveals persistent vulnerability in both countries.

As Ethiopia’s case shows, progress can be undone. Rising political exclusion is leading to huge food security risks, particularly in the Tigray region where aid is currently largely blocked amid the ongoing violent conflict.

Equally worrisome is Somalia’s situation, where both local and external actors have struggled to build state capacity or inclusion in the face of a long-running violent insurgency.

What can work

My book provides some hopeful insights, as well as caution. It shows that for countries like Ethiopia and Bangladesh, international assistance can help address weak state capacity. Donors worked with local officials to address specific climate hazards, like drought and cyclones.

Such international assistance helped compensate for weak state capacity through discrete investments in early warning systems, targeted social services, such as food assistance or cash transfers, and hazard-specific protective infrastructure, such as cyclone shelters.

Those examples suggest that climate adaptation can save lives and contribute to economic prosperity.

However, as the unfolding dynamic in Ethiopia shows, progress can be reversed. Moreover, it’s far more challenging for external actors to build inclusive political institutions if local actors are not so inclined.

With climate change intensifying extreme weather events around the world, it is incumbent upon policymakers to enhance the practice of environmental peacebuilding, both to resolve ongoing conflicts through better natural resource management and to prevent future emergencies.

Joshua Busby, Professor, University of Texas at Austin

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

By Hisham Allam
Cairo, Oct 27 2022 – COP 27’s official Youth Envoy, Dr Omnia El Omrani, realised the impact of climate change in 2017, and Hurricane Irma slammed Miami.

As a doctor, she witnessed the influx of emergency patients into the hospital as a result of the hurricane, which piqued her interest in environmental and climate issues. She described it as a significant milestone in her life.

“As a result, I decided to become an activist in the areas of public health and climate change over the ensuing years. I did this by attending events as a representative of a global organisation of medical students and young doctors, starting with the COP24 Climate Change Summit in Poland in 2018 and continuing through the Glasgow Conference in Britain in 2021,” Omnia said in an interview with IPS.

El Omrani is an Egyptian plastic and reconstruction surgery resident, community leader and climate change activist. She was appointed by the President-designate of the 27th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP27), Sameh Shoukry.

Host country Egypt has committed to empowering youth. It sees the role of the youth envoy as a way to encourage and promote youth perspectives before COP27 and throughout the negotiations and conference itself.

El Omrani sees herself as central to involving the world’s young people at COP27 to promote climate action and implementation with the critical interventions necessary for the conference’s implementation-focused strategy.

The Youth Climate Summit COY17’s most significant outcome is to develop a statement that reflects the youth’s perception of the problem – and to suggest solutions.

The youth statement’s coordination began ahead of the COY17 youth summit, and YOUNGO with working groups will review and edit a draught version in Sharm El-Sheikh from November 2–4, after which it will be sent to the COP27 president, she explained.

“The unique thing that we will do this year On the Young and Future Generations Day (November 10), we will have a roundtable discussion instead of a panel discussion at COP27. Here we will bring together high-ranking officials, negotiators, and ministers and YOUNGO to discuss the statement and (debate) how to get it implemented,” El Omrani said.

YOUNGO is the UNFCCC’s official youth constituency.

El Omrani said, “It’s exceedingly challenging to convince wealthy nations to convert pledges into actual funding, but certain approaches could help”.

These approaches include providing solid evidence on the impact of climate change. For example, Pakistan floods this year caused massive damage to the country’s economy. Small island countries share similar issues. Likewise, severe heat waves swept through Europe.

El Omrani, who is 27, has represented over 1.3 million medical students, leading their global advocacy and policy work on climate change with the UNFCCC, UNEP, and WHO, while also being engaged in climate action projects across Egypt and the world.

El Omrani was the International Federation of Medical Students’ Association’s National Public Officer, MENA Focal Point, and Liaison Officer for Public Health Issues.

She has participated in climate discussions at COP24, COP25, and COP26, environmental projects, and international climate conferences, such as the WHO Civil Society Group to Advance Climate and Health.

“I believe it is my responsibility to inform people about the significance of climate change in my community and at the institution where I work as a doctor. I also believe I must deliver these messages to decision-makers and urge them to act on this issue,” she added.

“I am now developing a curriculum to be taught at universities to increase awareness of climate change issues, not just in Egypt but also throughout Africa, in collaboration with Ain Shams University in Egypt.”

Aside from that, she participates in a wide range of charitable activities and projects coordinated by the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the European Union, the Lancet Scientific Journal, and other international groups focused on health, women’s issues, and climate change.

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By Noeleen Heyzer
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 27 2022 – The political, human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar continues to take a catastrophic toll on the people, with serious regional implications.

More than 13.2 million people are food insecure, about 40 percent of the population is living below the poverty line and 1.3 million are internally displaced. Military operations continue with disproportionate use of force including aerial bombings, burning of civilian structures, and the killing of civilians including children.

I condemn the indiscriminate airstrikes on a celebration in Kachin State that killed large numbers of civilians days ago. The People’s Defence Forces are also accused of targeting civilians.

The plight of the Rohingya people, along with other forcefully displaced communities, remains desperate, with many seeking refuge through dangerous land and sea journeys. The price of impunity is a grave reminder that accountability remains essential.

Since the release of the Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Myanmar, violence between the Arakan Army and the military in Rakhine has escalated to levels not seen since late 2020, with significant cross-border incursions, endangering all communities, harming conditions for durable return, and prolonging the burden on Bangladesh as host of about 1 million Rohingya refugees.

As the Myanmar crisis deepens, I continue to promote a coordinated international strategy, in line with my mandate, engaging all stakeholders for an inclusive Myanmar-led process to return to the democratic transition.

A child looks after his younger sibling in Myanmar. Credit: World Bank/Tom Cheatham

My first visit to Myanmar as Special Envoy in August to meet the military’s Commander-in-Chief was part of broader efforts by the UN to urgently support a return to civilian rule based on the will and needs of the people.

I made six requests during the visit: ending aerial bombing and burning of civilian infrastructure; delivery of humanitarian assistance without discrimination; the release of all children and political prisoners; a moratorium on executions; the well-being of and engagement with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.

I also highlighted Myanmar’s responsibility for creating conducive conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees. Soon after, I visited Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar on the five-year anniversary of the Rohingya’s mass displacement, where I expressed the United Nations’ appreciation for Bangladesh’s generosity and heeded Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s statements that the current situation is unsustainable.

A highlight of the visit was my discussions with women and youth in the refugee camps. They made it clear that they need to be engaged directly in discussions and decisions about their future.

Their rights and protection, in particular their citizenship, freedom of movement and security, must be guaranteed, guided by the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. Going forward, I will continue to strengthen co-operation with ASEAN and engagement with all stakeholders.

While there is little room for the de-escalation of violence or for “talks about talks” in the present zero-sum situation, there are some concrete ways to reducing the suffering of the people. Recognizing that many more people will be forced to flee the violence,

I will continue to urge ASEAN to develop a regional protection framework for refugees and forcefully displaced persons. The recent forced return of Myanmar nationals, some of whom were detained on arrival, underlines the urgency of a coordinated ASEAN response to address shared regional challenges caused by the conflict.

Education and skills development are powerful tools to prepare Rohingya refugees for their return to Myanmar, which I continue to advocate, working closely with leaders of ASEAN and neighbouring countries as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Key Ethnic Armed Organizations and the National Unity Government have together appealed for me to convene an Inclusive Forum for engagement to facilitate protection and humanitarian assistance to ALL people in need, in observance of International Humanitarian Law.

I have also initiated a women, peace and security (WPS) platform on Myanmar with the Foreign Minister of Indonesia to amplify the needs of women affected by the conflict, and their leadership as agents of change.

To conclude, there is a new political reality in Myanmar: a people demanding change, no longer willing to accept military rule. I will continue to appeal to all governments and other key stakeholders to listen to the people and be guided by their will to prevent deeper catastrophe in the heart of Asia.

Noeleen Heyzer, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, in her address to the United Nations General Assembly’s Third Committee 25 October 2022

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By Baher Kamal
MADRID, Oct 27 2022 – No. No lettuce, no matter how British it may be, could outlast such a steady depletion of the very foundation of life.

Now, new facts about such depletion come to add to the already reported ones regarding the unstopped, man-made dangers threatening the present and future of indispensable natural resources.

These are some of the biggest reasons explaining how the web of life is unrelentlessly agonising:

1.- Poison

A recent scientific study by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reveals the following:

– The millions of tons of plastic swirling around the world’s oceans have garnered a lot of media attention recently. But plastic pollution poses a bigger threat to the plants and animals – including humans – who are based on land.

Nano-sized particles may cause inflammation, traverse cellular barriers, and even cross highly selective membranes such as the blood-brain barrier or the placenta. Within the cell, they can trigger changes in gene expression and biochemical reactions, among other things

— Very little of the plastic we discard every day is recycled or incinerated in waste-to-energy facilities. Much of it ends up in landfills, where it may take up to 1,000 years to decompose, leaching potentially toxic substances into the soil and water.

– Researchers in Germany are warning that the impact of microplastics in soils, sediments and freshwater could have a long-term negative effect on such ecosystems. They say terrestrial microplastic pollution is much higher than marine microplastic pollution – estimated at four to 23 times higher, depending on the environment.

– Fragments of plastic are present practically all over the world and can trigger many kinds of adverse effects.

– One third of all plastic waste ends up in soils or freshwater. Most of this plastic disintegrates into particles smaller than five millimetres, known as microplastics, and these break down further into nanoparticles (less than 0.1 micrometre in size). The problem is that these particles are entering the food chain.

2. Sewage is an important factor in the distribution of microplastics. In fact, between 80% and 90% of the plastic particles contained in sewage, such as from garment fibres, persist in the sludge, says the study.

– Sewage sludge is often applied to fields as fertiliser, meaning that several thousand tons of microplastics end up in our soils each year. Microplastics can even be found in tap water.

– Moreover, the surfaces of tiny fragments of plastic may carry disease-causing organisms and act as a vector for diseases in the environment.

— Microplastics can also interact with soil fauna, affecting their health and soil functions. “Earthworms, for example, make their burrows differently when microplastics are present in the soil, affecting the earthworm’s fitness and the soil condition,” says an article in Science Daily about the research.

3.- Toxic

In 2020, the first-ever field study to explore how the presence of microplastics can affect soil fauna was published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society. The paper notes that terrestrial microplastic pollution has led to the decrease of species that live below the surface, such as mites, larvae and other tiny creatures that maintain the fertility of the land.

– Chlorinated plastic can release harmful chemicals into the surrounding soil, which can then seep into groundwater or other surrounding water sources, and also the ecosystem. This can cause a range of potentially harmful effects on the species that drink the water.

– When plastic particles break down, they gain new physical and chemical properties, increasing the risk that they will have a toxic effect on organisms. And the larger the number of potentially affected species and ecological functions, the more likely it is that toxic effects will occur.

– Chemical effects are especially problematic at the decomposition stage. Additives such as phthalates and Bisphenol leach out of plastic particles. These additives are known for their hormonal effects and can disrupt the hormone system of vertebrates and invertebrates alike.

– In addition, nano-sized particles may cause inflammation, traverse cellular barriers, and even cross highly selective membranes such as the blood-brain barrier or the placenta. Within the cell, they can trigger changes in gene expression and biochemical reactions, among other things.

4.- Pests

Should all this not be enough, please be reminded that:

– Up to 40% of food crops are lost due to plant pests and diseases every single year, according to the world’s top food and agriculture organisation.

This is affecting both food security and agriculture, the main source of income for vulnerable rural communities, FAO warned on the occasion of the International Day of Plant Health on 12 May 2022.

– Two main factors, among several others, appear behind the increasing expansion of plant pests and diseases. One is that climate change and human activities are altering ecosystems and damaging biodiversity while creating new niches for pests to thrive.

– The other one is that international travel and trade, which has tripled in volume in the last decade, is also spreading pests and diseases.

– Such pests and diseases cause massive crop losses and leave millions without enough food.

– Desert locust, fall armyworm, fruit flies, banana disease TR4, cassava diseases and wheat rusts are among the most destructive transboundary plant pests and diseases.

5.- The Market lords

All the above shocking facts should pose several tough questions.

For instance: if food production –and food health– are so endangered, why discard as much as 20% of all of it just because they are not “nice” enough for selling them in the supermarket?

Why are all these special deals offering two or even three products while paying the price of just one? Aren’t such marketing techniques the major cause why up to one third of all food is lost and wasted?

By the way: all grown-in-soil food should by nature be taken as biological and ecological. In addition to sunshine, all food needs soil, water, and air to grow, right?

But being the soil, the water, and the air so highly contaminated, why sell them at double price just because the market lords brand them as biological and ecological?

By Philippe Benoit
PARIS, Oct 26 2022 – With COP 27 approaching, pressure is mounting on wealthy countries to increase their support to poorer ones in the face of climate change. The recent floods in Pakistan have amplified this issue.  China, as the world’s second largest economy, will similarly face increasing pressure to help other developing countries on climate. 

At last year’s COP, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) unveiled an innovative program to fund the early retirement of coal power plants by mobilizing capital to buy-out the investors in these plants. This approach has an interesting, and potentially even easier, application to the coal plants financed by China in Pakistan and elsewhere overseas under its Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”).  The key to unlocking this, somewhat surprisingly, lies in the dominance of China’s state-owned companies in BRI transactions.

At last year’s COP, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) unveiled an innovative program to fund the early retirement of coal power plants by mobilizing capital to buy-out the investors in these plants. This approach has an interesting, and potentially even easier, application to the coal plants financed by China in Pakistan and elsewhere overseas under its Belt and Road Initiative

In 2015, Beijing and Islamabad launched a program under the BRI to build a series of new power plants in Pakistan.  Over the next five years, five coal plants were commissioned and there are currently an additional four plants under construction. These plants are largely being developed by Chinese energy firms with loans from Chinese banks and financiers … companies that are all mostly owned by the Chinese Government.

Beijing has repeatedly been criticized for the BRI’s funding of new coal power plants considered to exacerbate the climate vulnerabilities of the countries where these projects are being built, like Pakistan.  Even as President Xi pledged last year to stop building new coal-fired power plants abroad, there has been an increasing understanding that achieving the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement — and reducing the type of climate devastation experienced by Pakistan – requires not only slowing new construction, but also retiring existing coal power plants early, worldwide.

In response to this challenge, the ADB announced the Energy Transition Mechanism which includes an initiative to buy out existing coal investors to shutter their plants early and thereby avoid the attendant future emissions. Typically, this would involve mobilizing international financing from multilateral development banks, climate funds, etc. to compensate the private sector investors in these plants.

Interestingly, the dominance in the BRI’s overseas projects of China’s state-owned companies creates the opportunity for the Chinese Government to apply the ADB mechanism in a streamlined manner — under what could be called the “BRI Clean Energy Transition Mechanism”. How might this work?  Some initial ideas follow.

As noted above, Chinese state-owned financial institutions are the major lenders to the BRI coal power projects in Pakistan. Similarly, Chinese government-owned energy firms are the dominant coal plant owners.  It is the financial interests of these various Chinese state-owned lenders and other enterprises (SOEs) that would be affected adversely by any early retirement.

Consequently, under the proposed mechanism, China would be compensating its own SOEs for the revenues they would lose in the future from the early plant retirements in Pakistan. In essence, China would pay itself.  This is a unique feature of this BRI coal retirement program that flows from China’s reliance on its own SOEs … and it presents several operational and financial advantages.

1. The financial arrangements for early retirement should be easier to negotiate and execute since the parties are all affiliated — i.e., the Chinese government, its state-owned banks and other SOEs. This should also reduce transaction costs.
2. In the ADB’s early retirement context, private sector investors would typically insist on some compensation being paid today for the loss of projected future revenues. In contrast, because the BRI context would involve compensation from the Chinese Government to its own SOEs, the Government could reasonably delay payments till the point at which the SOEs would actually be foregoing revenues. So, for example, if we assume early retirement in 2030 — an interval that would give Pakistan the time to replace the retired coal electricity generation with renewables in an orderly manner (see discussion below) – then the payments by the Chinese Government to its SOE lenders and energy firms could similarly be deferred till that time.
3. The Government would also, as a practical matter, enjoy significant discretion regarding the level of compensation to be paid to its SOE lenders and energy firms in 2030 and beyond. Notably, the Government could impose a discount on these future payments — especially if it has implemented by that time financial disincentives targeting coal generation (e.g., a carbon price) to support its own carbon peaking and neutrality goals.
4. The proposed BRI mechanism would resemble in various ways a debt-for-nature swap, notably from the perspective of China as a creditor/donor country.  In this BRI “debt-for-coal” swap, China would forego the payments due its SOEs in the future from the operation of these Pakistan coal plants in exchange for the reduced emissions generated by their early retirement. Significantly, this mechanism would produce emissions avoidance benefits without China providing any new overseas funding.

What are some possible motivations for Beijing to launch this type of initiative?

First, it provides a mechanism for China to respond to the increasing pressure it is facing as the world’s second largest economy to help poorer developing countries meet their climate and sustainability challenges. China’s status as the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases amplifies this pressure.

Second, the ability to launch an international climate program that does not require China to disburse funds for the next several years — and, when it does so, to pay its own SOEs — may appeal to the Government, particularly given the current domestic economic stress.  This is consistent with other debt-for-nature swap programs advanced by other donor countries where the financial cost to the donor is from foregone revenues, not new funding.

Moreover, the loss in revenues for China and its SOEs from the early BRI coal plant retirements would only take place in 2030 when China’s economy should be markedly larger and more capable of absorbing the expense.

Finally, there is an argument that to the extent the ADB and BRI approaches retire the same type of coal capacity with the same climate benefits, China’s inducements to its SOEs to retire BRI coal assets early should be counted as international climate financial support (e.g., a type of “synthetic carbon credit”) just as actual monetary transfers to private sector investors would be recognized with respect to an ADB coal retirement transaction.

Importantly, Pakistan and other BRI developing countries will need even more electricity to power their economic development. Consequently, the BRI Clean Energy Transition Mechanism needs to include additional funding for new renewables power generation capacity (as is the case under the ADB’s approach).

Helping BRI-recipient countries to transition from coal to renewables would also support international efforts to reduce emissions — efforts whose importance for Pakistan and various other developing countries has been made abundantly evident by the devastating weather they have been experiencing.

The extreme climate events of 2022 have increased awareness regarding the vulnerability of poorer countries to climate change and the consequent importance of reducing future emissions.  This article sets out a proposal for how China could retire BRI coal plants early in Pakistan and elsewhere that capitalizes on its use of state-owned companies, while supporting more renewables in these countries to reduce the climate change threat and promote sustainable economic growth.

Philippe Benoit has over 20 years working on international energy, climate and development issues, including management positions at the World Bank and the International Energy Agency. He is currently research director at Global Infrastructure Analytics and Sustainability 2050.