By Katsuhiro Asagiri
TOKYO/ASTANA, Aug 19 2024 – In a world increasingly shadowed by the threat of nuclear conflict, Kazakhstan is stepping up its efforts in the global disarmament movement. On August 27-28, 2024, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Kazakhstan will host a critical workshop in Astana. This gathering, the first of its kind in five years, is set to reinvigorate the five existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and enhance cooperation and consultation among them.

This initiative aligns with UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s Agenda for Disarmament, particularly Action 5, which emphasizes the strengthening of NWFZs through enhanced collaboration between zones, urging nuclear-armed states to respect relevant treaties, and supporting the establishment of new zones, such as in the Middle East. This effort reflects the global community’s ongoing push to reduce the nuclear threat and foster regional and global peace.

Kazakhstan’s Historical Commitment to Disarmament

Kazakhstan’s vision for a nuclear-free world is deeply rooted in its leadership in global disarmament efforts. This vision is not just aspirational; it is grounded in the country’s lived experience of the devastating impact of nuclear weapons. The Semipalatinsk Test Site in northeastern Kazakhstan, often referred to as “the Polygon,” was the site of 456 nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1989. These tests exposed over 1.5 million people to radiation, resulting in severe health consequences, including cancer and birth defects, as well as environmental degradation.

Kazakhstan’s dedication to disarmament is further highlighted by its initiative to establish August 29 as the International Day against Nuclear Tests, recognized by the United Nations. This date commemorates both the first Soviet nuclear test at Semipalatinsk in 1949 and the closure of the site in 1991, serving as a reminder of the horrors of nuclear testing and a call to action for the global community.

The Role of NWFZs in Global Security

NWFZs are critical components of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. There are five established NWFZs, created through treaties: Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), Treaty of Semey (Central Asia) In addition, Mongolia’s unique status as a self-declared nuclear-weapon-free state, recognized through a United Nations General Assembly resolution, exemplifies a national commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

These zones prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons within their territories, reinforced by international verification and control systems. NWFZs play a crucial role in maintaining regional stability, reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, and promoting global disarmament.

Astana Workshop: A Critical Gathering for Disarmament

The upcoming workshop in Astana is a critical opportunity for states-parties to the five NWFZ treaties, alongside representatives from international organizations, to engage in vital discussions aimed at overcoming the challenges facing these zones. This gathering is particularly timely, given the escalating geopolitical tensions in regions where nuclear capabilities remain central to national security.

A key focus of the workshop will be on enhancing cooperation among the NWFZs, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. This includes facilitating consultation between the zones and encouraging nuclear-armed states to adhere to the protocols of these treaties. The workshop builds on the 2019 seminar titled “Cooperation Among Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia,” co-organized by UNODA and Kazakhstan in Nur-Sultan(Astana), which produced key recommendations aimed at revitalizing cooperation among NWFZs.

Participants will discuss strategies to advance the objectives of NWFZs, with an emphasis on strengthening security benefits for member states and fostering more robust consultation mechanisms. The workshop will also address the challenges posed by the reluctance of certain nuclear-armed states, particularly the United States, to ratify protocols related to several NWFZ treaties. Despite being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the U.S. has yet to ratify protocols to treaties covering the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia. This reluctance has impeded the full realization of the security benefits these zones could offer.

Kazakhstan’s Leadership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

Kazakhstan’s role in nuclear disarmament extends beyond NWFZs to include leadership in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). In March 2025, Kazakhstan will host the 3rd Meeting of State Parties to the TPNW at the United Nations, further solidifying its position as a champion of nuclear disarmament.

Kazakhstan has been a vocal advocate of the TPNW and has actively pushed for the creation of an international fund to support victims of nuclear testing and remediate environments affected by nuclear activities, in line with Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty.

The Vienna Action Plan, developed during the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW（１MSP）, outlines actions for implementing these articles, including exploring the feasibility of an international trust fund and encouraging affected states parties to assess the impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing and to develop national plans for implementation.

At the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP), co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati, progress was made, but challenges remain. The informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation presented a report, and its mandate was renewed, with the goal of submitting recommendations for the establishment of an international trust fund at the 3rd Meeting of States Parties (3MSP). Kazakhstan’s leadership in this area underscores its commitment to addressing the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, drawing from its own experience with the devastating consequences of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk.

Civil Society’s Crucial Role

As a part of the two day event, Soka Gakkai International (SGI) from Japan and the Center for International Security and Policy (CISP) will hold a side event in the evening of September 28 to screen the documentary “I Want to Live On: The Untold Stories of the Polygon,” highlighting the survivors of nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk. This documentary, produced by CISP with SGI’s support, was first shown at the UN during the second meeting of state parties to the TPNW in 2023. This side event is part of a broader initiative by SGI and Kazakhstan, which have co-organized several events focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at UN, Vienna, and Astana in recent years.

Also coinciding with the Astana workshop, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) will hold a conference convening civil society organizations and activists including Hibakusha from some countries. This confluence of governmental and civil society efforts in Astana marks a significant moment in the global disarmament movement. While diplomats and state representatives discuss policy and cooperation during the official workshop, the parallel activities organized by civil society will amplify the humanitarian message and emphasize the urgent need for a world free of nuclear weapons.

As global tensions rise, the Astana workshop represents a beacon of hope, a critical moment in the global journey toward disarmament. Through cooperation, dialogue, and a shared commitment to peace, the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons remains within reach. Kazakhstan, with the support of the international community, is at the forefront of this vital effort.

INPS Japan/IPS UN Bureau

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By Muhammad Aamir
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Aug 19 2024 – In May, temperatures soared above 52° Celsius (125.6° Fahrenheit) in Pakistan’s southern province of Sindh. To cope, Samina Kanwal, a community health worker with Action Against Hunger, began work at 7:00 am — the earliest time possible given neighborhood security protocols — to travel door-to-door helping vulnerable with the health consequences of extreme heat including heatstroke, difficulties with brain function, and even hunger.

Of course, these consequences extend beyond Pakistan with the world experiencing the hottest day ever recorded this summer. The health implications are real — and they are growing with the heat.

Heat is a Health Risk

Over time, heat strains the body as it tries to cool itself, worsening chronic conditions from asthma to diabetes. It is also causes pregnancy and birth complications, with the rates of premature births increasing after heat waves.

Heat-related illness occurs because of exposure to high temperatures. Heatstroke can develop in just a few hours and can involve seizures, heart complications, and brain swelling, with high fatality rates. In fact, heat-related deaths worldwide increased by 74% from 1980 to 2016, and researchers attribute nearly 40% of those deaths to climate change.

A drought and a heat wave hit the Baluchistan region of Pakistan in June 2024. Credit Action Against Hunger

Diarrhea – the third leading cause of death in children younger than five in average temperatures – is much more severe in extreme heat when the symptoms of severe dehydration and fluid loss are compounded. While people typically are advised to drink more fluids as temperatures rise, that assumes access to clean water, which isn’t the case for more than 2 billion people worldwide.

Brain health is impacted by extreme heat: cognitive function decreases as temperatures rise. One study found that for every degree above 22° Celsius (72° Fahrenheit), standardized test scores fell 0.2% — assuming that school takes place at all. In communities with limited resources, climate-controlled buildings are rare. To protect students, Pakistan’s Punjab province closed schools for a week this summer, leaving 52% of school-age children at home.

Mental health also suffers due to extreme heat. Hot days are associated with higher risk of emergency room visits for substance abuse, mood and anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, and dementia. Studies show that every 1° increase in temperature can increase suicide rates. The effects are pronounced in agricultural areas, where heat damages crops and economic prospects.

During May’s heatwave, the need for antibiotics and antipyretics (also known as fever reducers) became so great that Action Against Hunger, local authorities, and other partners quickly came together to prevent shortages and manage other health risks, like filling and carrying jugs of clean water. To reduce the impacts on the women and girls that this task typically falls to, we expanded shaded areas around community water sources.

Heat and Hunger

Drought and crop failure are obvious consequences of heat that impact food accessibility. High temperatures can dry soil, lowering crop yields and driving up food prices. These impacts become more widespread as climate change accelerates, and it’s already impacting nutrition among vulnerable populations.

Extreme heat intensified chronic and acute malnutrition in multiple West African countries, an area vulnerable to deadly heat waves. Over a 90 day period, just 14 days of temperatures between 86 and 95° led to a 2.2% increase in child “wasting,” which happens when a child loses muscle and fat tissue, becoming too thin for their height.

For every 100 hours of exposure to a temperature above 95° Fahrenheit, the “stunting rate” among children — where a child is too short for their age — increased by 5.9%.

Today, one in four children is undernourished. But researchers have warned that if the global temperature increases by 2°, the rate of stunting due to heat exposure will nearly double. Without a concerted effort from the global community to mitigate climate change, the world is on track to surpass this threshold, leading to devastating health impacts for children, families, and communities.

Low-income countries will feel these effects the most, as most poorer nations are located in regions that will be two to five times more susceptible to heat waves than richer countries by the 2060s. These challenges are compounded by other climate impacts: Pakistan, one of the countries most impacted by climate change, suffered drought followed by historic flooding that submerged crops and killed thousands of livestock that people rely on for basic food and income.

This zig-zag between extremes has left more than two million people in need of emergency assistance. The climate crisis is a health crisis. Paradoxically, heatmakes it harder to engage in protective measures. And health systems are not well prepared to deal with an additional influx of patients alongside the burden that heat waves place on everything from supply chains to the power grid.

Solutions for the Future

The good news is that efforts are underway to create more climate-resilient health systems. Leaders increasingly recognize the need for a “one health” approach that acts on the interconnections between human and environmental health. We also need to ensure that the links between heat and hunger are central to that agenda.

Developing climate change early action plans and leading simulation exercises for key stakeholders is crucial to a solution. We have implemented programs, for example, that contributed to agricultural benefits over time: farmers were able to store 15% additional seeds for the next cultivation cycle, and preservation practices of rice and wheat stock improved by 100%.

Beneficiaries also reported a 25% decrease in soil-related issues due to flooding, which shows that the program had a positive impact on mitigating the effects of climate disasters. The introduction of irrigation systems and water management techniques helped farmers overcome weather-related challenges.

Solutions like income generation opportunities, promotion of climate-smart agriculture practices, climate-friendly irrigation systems, provision of treatment for severely malnourished children, and additive health services will be key to creating a sustainable and thriving world amid increasing temperatures.

Muhammad Aamir is Pakistan Country Director, Action Against Hunger

IPS UN Bureau

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By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Aug 19 2024 – Back in August 2003, the United Nations faced one of its violent tragedies when a terrorist attack on the UN headquarters in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad claimed the lives of 22 people.

Among those killed was Sergio Vieira de Mello of Brazil, the UN envoy in Iraq and High Commissioner for Human Rights, who had a long and distinguished UN career stretching over 30 years.

As the UN commemorated World Humanitarian Day on August 19, it continues to be confronted with rising death tolls among both its humanitarian workers and peacekeepers worldwide.

The commemorative day was established by the General Assembly in 2008 after the 2003 bomb attack in Baghdad.

At last count, at least 254 aid workers have been killed since the current 10-month-old war began in Gaza on Oct. 7 last year, and about 188 worked for UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees.

According to the UN, “2023 was the deadliest year on record for humanitarian workers and 2024 is on track to be even worse”.

In a statement ahead of World Humanitarian Day, Dennis Francis, President of the193-member General Assembly said aid organizations – from all over the world – have united to call for the protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel, as well as to ensure their safe and unhindered access, including across conflict lines.

Footage of destruction of Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza, following an Israeli siege. The World Health Organization (WHO) reiterated that hospitals must be respected and protected; they must not be used as battlefields. Credit: UN News

Attacks on humanitarian workers and humanitarian assets must stop, as well as on civilians and civilian infrastructure, he said.

Besides the UN and its agencies, some of the world’s humanitarian organizations in war zones include Doctors Without Borders, CARE International, Save the Children and the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.

Last April, seven members from World Central Kitchen (WCK) were killed in an Israeli air strike in Gaza. The WCK said its team was traveling in a deconflicted zone in two armored cars branded with the WCK logo and a soft skin vehicle.

Despite coordinating movements with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the convoy was hit as it was leaving the Deir al-Balah warehouse, where the team had unloaded more than 100 tons of humanitarian food aid brought to Gaza on the maritime route.

“This is not only an attack against WCK, this is an attack on humanitarian organizations showing up in most dire situations where food is being used as a weapon of war. This is unforgivable,” said WCK CEO Erin Gore.

The seven killed were from Australia, Poland, United Kingdom, a dual citizen of the U.S. and Canada, and Palestine.

“I am heartbroken and appalled that we—World Central Kitchen and the world—lost beautiful lives because of a targeted attack by the IDF. The love they had for feeding people, the determination they embodied to show that humanity rises above all, and the impact they made in countless lives will forever be remembered and cherished,” said Gore.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than half of the 2023 deaths were recorded in the first three months – October to December – of the hostilities in Gaza, mostly as a result of airstrikes.

Extreme levels of violence in Sudan and South Sudan have also contributed to the tragic death toll, both in 2023 and in 2024. In all these conflicts, most of the casualties are among national staff. Many humanitarian workers also continue to be detained in Yemen.

“The normalization of violence against aid workers and the lack of accountability are unacceptable, unconscionable and enormously harmful for aid operations everywhere,” said Joyce Msuya, Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

“Today, we reiterate our demand that people in power act to end violations against civilians and the impunity with which these heinous attacks are committed.”

On this World Humanitarian Day, aid workers and those supporting their efforts around the globe have organized events to stand in solidarity and spotlight the horrifying toll of armed conflicts, including on humanitarian staff, she said.

In addition, a joint letter from leaders of humanitarian organizations will be sent to the Member States of the UN General Assembly asking the international community to end attacks on civilians, protect all aid workers, and hold perpetrators to account.

Everyone can add their voice by joining and amplifying the digital campaign using the hashtag #ActforHumanity.

Meanwhile, UN peacekeeping is considered virtually humanitarian—but with a military angle– in conflict ridden countries and war zones where they are also vulnerable to attacks.

At least 11 United Nations personnel — seven military personnel and four civilians — were killed in deliberate attacks in 2023, the United Nations Staff Union Standing Committee on the Security and Independence of the International Civil Service pointed out.

And 32 UN peacekeeping personnel — 28 military and four police, including one woman police officer — were killed in deliberate attacks in 2022, the United Nations Staff Union said.

For the ninth year in a row, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was the deadliest for peacekeepers with 14 fatalities, followed by 13 fatalities in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), four fatalities in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and one fatality in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

The figures for preceding years are as follows: 2021 (25 killed); 2020 (15 killed); 2019 (28 killed); 2018 (34 killed); 2017 (71 killed); 2016 (32 killed); 2015 (51 killed); 2014 (61 killed); 2013 (58 killed); 2012 (37 killed); 2011 (35 killed); and 2010 (15 killed).

Roderic Grigson, who was with the UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) on the Egyptian- Israeli border, told IPS the duties of a peacekeeper are extremely hazardous.

“Our job as peacekeepers was to insert ourselves between two warring forces and keep them apart while peace negotiations were conducted at the UN HQ in New York or elsewhere”

Sometimes, he said, those negotiations took years to happen. “The environment we worked in was often a recent warzone, scattered with unexploded shells and mines and the detritus of war.”

“The opposing forces always considered the UN peacekeepers suspicious, and we had to work hard to earn their trust. When travelling through the front lines into the buffer zone, you had to keep your wits about you”.

“We were never alone and were always in touch with headquarters over UHF radios in the clearly marked UN vehicles,” said Grigson, currently a book coach based in Melbourne, who teaches, mentors and supports writers. while running a publishing house for authors who wish to self-publish their stories.

From personal experience, he said, “I can state that I have been shot at several times, had to wear a helmet and body armour while I was working, and have experienced shelling by the two opposing forces who wished to make a point during the ongoing negotiations.”

One of my colleagues was killed while driving the daily mail truck when the road was mined overnight, said Grigson,

https://www.rodericgrigson.com/shorts/

IPS UN Bureau Report

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By Timothy A. Wise
CAMBRIDGE, MA., Aug 19 2024 – Closing arguments are in in the U.S. trade complaint against Mexico’s restrictions on genetically modified (GM) corn, with the three-arbitrator tribunal set to rule on the matter in November. The legitimacy of the trade agreement itself hangs in the balance.

In the course of the year-long process Mexico has dismantled U.S. claims, showing that its precautionary measures are permitted under the terms of the trade agreement, that its restrictions barely impact U.S. exports, and that it has a mountain of scientific evidence of risk to justify its precautionary policies.

Will the panel let the U.S. use a trade agreement stop a policy that barely affects trade?

The U.S. government requested this formal dispute-resolution process a year ago under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA) over Mexico’s February 2023 presidential decree that restricted the use of GM corn in tortillas and phased out the use of the herbicide glyphosate, which is applied to 80% of U.S. corn. Mexico cited evidence of both GM corn and glyphosate in tortillas and other common corn preparations and documented the risks from such exposures, particularly for a Mexican population that eats more than ten times the amount of corn consumed per capita in the United States.

Where is the trade restriction?

The U.S. claim has been specious from the start. In its complaint it mischaracterized Mexico’s presidential decree as a “Tortilla Corn Ban” and a “Substitution Instruction” to phase out imports of GM yellow corn for animal feed. Mexico, in its written filings in the case, has repeatedly objected to these terms.

By calling it a “tortilla corn ban” the U.S. is implying that Mexico has banned U.S. exports of white corn, the kind commonly used in tortillas. They haven’t. They only banned the use of GM corn in tortillas and in other foods made from minimally processed (ground) white corn. It is a ban on use, not imports. White corn exports, including GM white corn, still flow from the U.S. to Mexico. They just can’t be used in the tortilla/corn-flour food chain.

Because the vast majority of U.S. corn exports are yellow varieties for animal feed and industrial uses, the restriction barely affects U.S. corn producers. Where is the trade restriction?

Much of the U.S. case rests on its misleading characterization of the “Substitution Instruction” as a trade restriction. It is no such thing.

The U.S. argues that the 2023 decree mandates the eventual phase-out of all GM corn imports, threatening the $5 billion-per-year Mexican market for U.S. yellow corn – 97% of U.S. exports – overwhelmingly GM varieties mainly used as animal feed. Even though Mexico has no current restrictions on such U.S. exports, and none are planned, the U.S. argues that Mexico’s mandate threatens future profits it expected to receive from the trade agreement.

Trade lawyer Ernesto Hernández López took on the U.S. deception, pointing out that there is no mandate (instruction) to stop using GM corn, just to grow more alternative non-GM feed sources and use them as they become available. The original decree uses the term “gradual substitution” (sustitución paulatina) and makes clear that it is based on supplies being available.

As Hernández López points out, the trade panel should not accept a U.S. argument based overwhelmingly on hypothetical future reductions in Mexican imports of GM feed corn. The U.S. case is made all the weaker by data showing that U.S. feed-corn exports to Mexico have gone up significantly since the 2023 decree, a result of weak harvests due to drought.

Consider the facts

The USMCA tribunal should consider the facts:

• Mexico’s GM corn policies have barely impacted U.S. exporters. Yellow corn exports are booming and the border is wide open to white-corn exporters, even for tortillas if U.S. farmers switch to non-GM varieties.
• The USMCA agreement allows for such precautionary policies and even grants special exceptions for policies that support indigenous cultural practices. Mexican courts have repeatedly ruled that Mexicans have a constitutional right to protection of their heritage corn.
• The Mexican government and expert scientists in the case have presented reams of peer-reviewed science documenting the risks to Mexicans from GM corn with glyphosate residues, evidence the U.S. government has largely ignored in its formal rebuttals in the case.
• The U.S. is left with the weak argument that Mexico’s restrictions are a Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) health measure and require a strict risk assessment in advance of enacting the policy. Mexico argues that the policy is more than a health measure because it also protects the environment and indigenous rights. So no such risk assessment is required. Still, Mexico has produced plenty of science to show risk.

The Mexican government has also highlighted how lax and riddled with conflicts of interest the U.S. regulatory process is for GM corn, a charge backed by the U.S. Center for Food Safety. This means that, as a Reuters headline put it in March, “Mexico waiting on US proof that GM corn safe for its people.”

After hundreds of pages of filings and two days of hearings, Mexico is still waiting for that proof. Hopefully the tribunal will weigh the facts, dismiss the U.S. claim, and not allow the U.S. to misuse a trade agreement to stop a policy it doesn’t like.

Timothy A. Wise is a Senior Research Fellow at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute and the author of Eating Tomorrow: Agribusiness, Family Farmers and the Battle for the Future of Food.

IPS UN Bureau

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By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Aug 19 2024 – There was an unusual sense of hope going into Venezuela’s 28 July presidential election. Democracy seemed on the horizon. María Corina Machado, the opposition’s rallying figure, had inspired a rare level of enthusiasm, promising millions of exiles they’d soon be able to return to a new Venezuela.

It seemed voting could bring change. And in a way, it did: the election proved the opposition could win despite an incredibly skewed playing field. But President Nicolás Maduro, in office since 2013, quickly declared himself the winner despite all evidence to the contrary, unleashing repression on the many who took to the streets in protest.

The situation is now at a standstill, and a Maduro-led regime lacking any legitimacy may use ever greater repression to stay in power. Many are deeply disappointed, but longtime Venezuelan activists advise patience alongside ongoing pressure. They knew the election could be the beginning of a much longer process. Now it’s a matter of finding the right mix of protest and international incentives to force negotiations that could lead to an eventual transition to democracy.

Election day

Although there were irregularities during the vote, they didn’t seem major. Most people in Venezuela, unlike Venezuelans abroad, seemed able to vote, and opposition witnesses were mostly allowed to visit polling stations and receive a copy of tallies produced by voting machines, as entitled to by law.

Fraud was hatched elsewhere, in the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) Totalisation Room, where vote tallies from 30,000 polling stations are processed and results calculated. The body responsible for overseeing elections is dominated by government loyalists.

The voting system is technically flawless: it operates on a closed circuit, making it almost impossible to hack, and contains multiple safeguards. This means that on election day, voting data flowed into the CNE as expected, and the count appeared to go smoothly until about 40 per cent of votes cast had been counted. That’s when the authorities apparently realised they were losing by an insurmountable margin and stopped transmitting data. Witnesses for the opposition were denied entry to the Totalisation Room. The CNE website froze and became inaccessible – and has remained so since. Without a shred of evidence, the government blamed ‘massive international hacking’, allegedly by opponents based in North Macedonia.

Throughout the afternoon, senior government officials issued media statements seemingly designed to prepare people for the announcement of a ruling party victory. They circulated exit polls showing Maduro with a lead of over 20 points, supposedly from a polling company that turned out to be fake. Meanwhile, exit polls conducted by opposition and independent pollsters gave González around 70 per cent.

Finally, around midnight, the CNE announced on national television that Maduro had won with 51.20 per cent against González’s 44.20 per cent. The vote totals were exact percentages to one decimal place, a near impossibility. It looked as though someone had decided on a percentage for each of the two main candidates and taken it from there. Without providing any disaggregated data, the CNE declared Maduro re-elected president.

The Carter Center, the only independent election observer allowed, left Venezuela on 29 July, saying the results were unverifiable and the election couldn’t be considered democratic. The opposition, civil society and the international community have since called on the government to produce detailed vote tallies, to no avail.

On 13 August, a UN panel of experts issued a preliminary report concluding that the CNE had failed to comply with ‘basic measures of transparency and integrity’.

What’s changed

But the story doesn’t end with massive fraud: some profound changes have taken place that suggest this is only the beginning.

For the first time in memory, no significant section of the opposition boycotted the election. Instead, the opposition held a primary vote that chose Machado as a unity candidate, with more than two million people taking part, despite threats from the authorities, censorship and physical attacks on candidates at rallies. But the results were immediately annulled by the government-aligned Supreme Court, which upheld an old disqualification against Machado, due to an unsubstantiated corruption conviction. The government then made the opposition jump through hoops to name a replacement.

Machado pulled off the seemingly impossible job of transferring her popularity to her successor, a softly spoken former diplomat who wasn’t on the political radar.

In addition to being united, the opposition developed a strategy, Plan 600K, to do everything it could to scrutinise the election. It recruited some 600,000 volunteers, organised in comanditos, groups of around 10 people each. By early July, the opposition claimed that more than 58,300 comanditos had been formed. On election day, they were present at polling stations across Venezuela.

They stayed throughout the day, and when the polls closed, took a copy of the tally sheet, photographed it, scanned the QR code and transferred the data, along with the paper documentation, to collection centres. Knowing what was coming, the opposition had worked with programmers to replicate an electoral computing centre so they could process the data and independently produce real figures down to polling station level.

This novel strategy caught the government off guard. By the time the CNE made its first announcements, the opposition had already counted 30 per cent of the ballots and knew it had won by a wide margin. The following day, opposition leaders held a press conference claiming to have counted over 70 per cent of the votes, giving González an unassailable lead. They opened up their database to the public, allowing investigative journalists and election experts to verify its accuracy.

The revelation of the crude nature of the government’s fraud brought a second major shift: the withdrawal of support from some states that customarily support Maduro. On election night, only four friendly authoritarian governments – China, Cuba, Iran and Russia – congratulated Maduro on his supposed re-election.

At the other end of the spectrum, several governments in the Americas, including Canada and the USA, refused to recognise the official results. Some, such as Argentina’s far-right libertarian president Javier Milei, did so for ideological reasons. But the rejections that carried the most weight came from Latin America’s democratic left, best represented by Chile’s President Gabriel Boric, who based his position on the unconditional defence of democracy. In response, the Venezuelan government expelled the diplomatic delegations of the seven Latin American countries that had questioned the election.

Somewhere in between, the European Union and three left-wing American governments – Brazil, Colombia and Mexico – said they’d recognise the results once the government produced the vote tallies and these were independently verified. Ahead of the election, Brazilian President Lula da Silva and Colombian President Gustavo Petro called on the government to ensure transparent elections and respect the results. They’re now in the best position to negotiate a transition behind the scenes. They’re the countries that receive most of Venezuela’s migrants, more of whom might leave if the crisis isn’t resolved.

What hasn’t changed

Before the election, Maduro warned of a ‘bloodbath’ if he didn’t win. He’s responded as expected, just as he did in the face of mass protests in 2014 and 2017 – with brutal repression that left at least 25 dead.

From the early hours of 29 July, hundreds took to the streets to protest against the implausible official results, and by the morning there were thousands across the country, mostly in densely populated working-class neighbourhoods, once government strongholds.

Maduro called the protests a ‘fascist outbreak’ and announced the construction of new prisons for detainees. Repression was often left in the hands of ‘armed collectives’ of pro-government paramilitaries who blocked marches, beat protesters and kidnapped opposition election observers. Lists of people wanted for allegedly inciting violence, including journalists and members of the opposition, were circulated on social media, and the authorities called for people to report those taking part in protests. In some Caracas neighbourhoods, pro-government groups tried to intimidate people by marking the houses of people perceived to be opposition supporters.

Security forces used pellets and teargas against protesters and arbitrarily arrested hundreds, charging them with terrorism or incitement to hatred. Over 2,400 people were arrested, according to official figures. The UN Human Rights Office found that most detainees weren’t allowed to choose their own lawyer or contact their families, and classed some of these cases as enforced disappearances.

But even when repression forced people back into their homes in fear for their lives, sporadic pot-banging protests have continued to erupt.

What must change

Whether the election marks the beginning of a democratic transition will depend on a combination of three factors, none of which is sufficient on its own: mass protest, international pressure and division and defection among the military.

Many Venezuelans saw the election as their last chance before giving up and joining the millions who’ve left. The exodus, the turnout, the results and the ensuing protests are all signs that the vast majority no longer support the government, and many actively oppose it.

So far, opposition leaders have refrained from calling people out onto the streets because, given the regime’s repressive response, more protests will inevitably mean further casualties. But without mass mobilisation, the regime could quickly regain control and opposition leaders could end up in prison. It remains to be seen how many will dare to take to the streets, for how long and how far the government will go to suppress them.

Maduro will only leave when he calculates that the cost of staying is higher than the cost of leaving, so any international negotiation should aim to lower his exit costs. This means the price of transition would likely be an unpalatable concession of immunity – and therefore impunity – for Maduro and other top officials.

But there’s only so much international pressure can do. Maduro has already shown he’s willing to take the hit of international isolation if that’s what it takes to stay in power. He has systematically reneged on all his international commitments, including the Barbados Agreement that paved the way for the election. What’s more, the states most willing to broker a deal have little leverage because Venezuela doesn’t depend on them, while the countries it relies on, China and Russia, have no incentive to promote democracy.

Two of the three elements in the equation have begun to shift: a clear majority has expressed its will at the ballot box and on the streets, and ideologically close former international allies have insisted that the will of the people must be respected. The third remains an unknown. Even under siege and internationally isolated, the regime could survive if it remains determined to tackle the crisis with violence, as it has done so far, and if security forces remain on its side. The fate of millions depends on what happens next.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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