By Richmond Acheampong
ACCRA, Ghana , Dec 18 2024 – The climate crisis, a defining challenge of the 21st century, is not just an environmental issue; it is increasingly a critical arena for international diplomacy. From intense negotiations at COP summits to the politics of energy transitions and resource control, climate change is shaping the geopolitical landscape.

This dynamic reflects deep divides between developed and developing nations on climate justice and raises critical questions about whether global diplomacy can bridge these tensions to achieve meaningful change.

Climate Change

Climate change is a global problem requiring collective action, but the geopolitical nature of climate negotiations often complicates this goal. At international forums such as the Conference of the Parties (COP), countries are expected to come together to craft solutions to limit global temperature rises. However, these forums frequently highlight stark disparities in perspectives, priorities and responsibilities.

Developed nations, historically responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions, often push for ambitious global targets. Yet, they are also accused of failing to deliver on their promises of financial and technological support for developing nations.

Developing countries, on the other hand, prioritize adaptation and financial aid, arguing that their limited historical contributions to emissions and ongoing developmental needs make equity and fairness non-negotiable.

This tension has been a recurring theme, exemplified by the debates around loss and damage funding, the establishment of which marked a significant step at COP27 in Egypt. While the agreement was a victory for climate justice advocates, questions remain over its operationalization and whether it can meaningfully address the complex needs of vulnerable countries.

The Politics of Energy Transitions

The transition to renewable energy lies at the heart of climate action, but it also underpins new forms of geopolitical rivalry. The shift from fossil fuels to renewables disrupts existing power dynamics in the global energy market, creating opportunities and challenges.

Developed nations, equipped with technological advancements and financial resources, are positioning themselves as leaders in renewable energy. The European Union, for instance, has spearheaded green initiatives such as the European Green Deal, while the United States has invested heavily in clean energy infrastructure through the Inflation Reduction Act.

These countries frame their actions as models for others to follow, yet their own energy security priorities sometimes overshadow global equity concerns.

For resource-rich developing nations, the politics of energy transitions are more nuanced. Countries like Nigeria and Angola, whose economies rely heavily on fossil fuel exports, face the dual challenge of transitioning to renewables while maintaining economic stability.

Moreover, resource control over critical minerals like lithium, cobalt and rare earth elements, essential for renewable energy technologies, has turned countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo into focal points of international competition.

The scramble for these resources raises concerns over whether the renewable energy revolution will perpetuate the same extractive patterns that have historically marginalized the Global South.

Climate Justice

The concept of climate justice underscores the inequities between developed and developing nations in their capacity to combat and adapt to climate change. Developed nations, having industrialized on the back of carbon-intensive activities, are now urging the Global South to follow a low-carbon development path. However, this demand often neglects the realities faced by many developing nations.

Countries in the Global South are disproportionately affected by climate impacts despite contributing the least to global emissions. From rising sea levels in the Pacific Islands to desertification in the Sahel, vulnerable nations bear the brunt of a crisis they did not create. Calls for climate finance, particularly grants rather than loans, have been central to their demands, as they seek support for adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage recovery.

Yet, the failure of developed nations to fulfill their long-standing pledge of $100 billion annually in climate finance exacerbates mistrust. At COP28 and beyond, developing nations are likely to continue pressing for stronger commitments and mechanisms to ensure accountability. The tension lies not just in the amount of financing but also in its accessibility, with many vulnerable nations criticizing complex processes that delay much-needed support.

Diplomacy at COP

The annual COP summits are microcosms of the broader diplomatic battle over climate change. Since the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, these summits have sought to galvanize global action to limit temperature increases to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. However, the implementation of these commitments remains uneven and the ambition gap persists.

The Paris Agreement’s hallmark principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) captures the equity challenge at the heart of climate diplomacy. It acknowledges that while all nations must act on climate change, their responsibilities differ based on historical emissions and capacities.

Yet, operationalizing this principle often leads to disagreements. Developed nations emphasize collective action and insist that emerging economies like China and India ramp up their mitigation efforts. Conversely, developing nations argue that they should not bear the same burden as historically high emitters.

The incremental nature of COP negotiations also invites criticism. Critics argue that the focus on long-term goals often overshadows the urgency of immediate action, and the influence of powerful fossil fuel lobbyists at these summits further complicates progress. Despite these challenges, COP summits remain a vital platform for fostering dialogue, building coalitions, and driving incremental but meaningful change.

Beyond COP

The geopolitics of climate change extend far beyond COP negotiations. Climate action has become a strategic lever in foreign policy, with countries using it to forge alliances, exert influence and secure economic advantages.

For instance, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has incorporated green development as a key pillar, with Beijing promoting renewable energy projects across the Global South. However, critics question whether these projects align with sustainability goals or primarily serve China’s geopolitical interests.

Similarly, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes tariffs on carbon-intensive imports, is seen by some as a protectionist measure that could disadvantage developing countries.

The United States has also positioned itself as a climate leader under the Biden administration, rejoining the Paris Agreement and committing to ambitious domestic targets. However, its international credibility on climate action remains fragile, given its historical withdrawal from agreements and ongoing domestic political divisions.

Can Global Diplomacy Bridge the Divide?

The ability of global diplomacy to overcome tensions and achieve meaningful change hinges on several factors. First, trust-building measures, such as fulfilling climate finance commitments and establishing transparent mechanisms for loss and damage funding, are essential. Second, fostering inclusive decision-making that amplifies the voices of vulnerable nations can help bridge the North-South divide.

Innovative approaches, such as the Bridgetown Initiative proposed by Barbados, offer a potential roadmap. This initiative advocates for reforming the global financial system to better address climate vulnerabilities, emphasizing grants, concessional financing and debt relief for climate-affected countries. Such proposals highlight the need for structural changes that go beyond the traditional frameworks of climate diplomacy.

Finally, the rise of climate activism and youth movements worldwide has injected new urgency and accountability into the process. From Greta Thunberg’s Fridays for Future to indigenous movements defending natural resources, these voices challenge governments to act with greater ambition and equity.

Conclusion

The climate crisis is undeniably a diplomatic battlefield, reflecting deep-seated inequities and competing priorities. While international forums like COP provide a platform for negotiation, the path to meaningful change requires addressing the underlying tensions between developed and developing nations. Climate justice, equitable energy transitions, and innovative financial mechanisms must take center stage if global diplomacy is to succeed.

The stakes could not be higher. As the impacts of climate change accelerate, the world faces a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively. Only through genuine collaboration, rooted in fairness and shared responsibility, can humanity rise to the challenge and transform the climate crisis from a battlefield into a catalyst for global solidarity.

Richmond Acheampong is a journalist and columnist specializing in international affairs, a PR expert, and a journalism lecturer with a PhD in Journalism and expertise in global diplomacy and foreign policy. Contact: achmondsky@gmail.com

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By Promise Eze
ABUJA, Dec 18 2024 – In May 2024, Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé signed a new constitution, transitioning the country from a presidential to a parliamentary system. Under this new framework, lawmakers are responsible for electing the president.

Supporters of the reforms argue that this transition diminishes Faure Gnassingbé’s powers by making the presidency a largely ceremonial role. Human Rights Minister Yawa Djigbodi Tségan claimed the changes would improve democracy in the country. However, the opposition has called it a “constitutional coup,” accusing Gnassingbé of using it to entrench his power by removing term limits.

The new constitution extends presidential terms from five to six years and establishes a single-term limit. However, the nearly 20 years that Gnassingbé has already been in office will not be included in this count.

The reforms were passed by a parliament dominated by the ruling Union pour la République (UNIR) party, led by Gnassingbé. Despite public opposition, the president implemented the amendments after his party secured a majority in parliament.

A History of Power and Repression

The Gnassingbé family’s dominance began with President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who seized power in 1967, just a few years after Togo gained independence from France. Eyadéma ruled for 38 years, during which he removed presidential term limits in 2002. His regime was marked by severe repression and allegations of human rights abuses, including violent crackdowns on protests and political assassinations.

Human rights organizations like Amnesty International frequently condemned Eyadéma’s government for its brutality, but Eyadéma dismissed these claims as part of a denigratory campaign against him, insisting that true Togolese democracy was based on security and peace.

After Eyadéma’s death in 2005, his son, Faure Gnassingbé, was installed as president by the military, sparking widespread protests and violence. Faure has since won disputed elections in 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. Despite reinstating term limits in 2019, they were not applied retroactively, allowing Faure to remain in office until at least 2030.

Gnassingbé’s Constitutional Façade

Many critics argue that the recent constitutional changes are simply a cover for Faure Gnassingbé to maintain control. Under the new system, the president will serve a largely ceremonial role, while real power will rest with the “president of the council of ministers,” a position that is expected to go to Gnassingbé himself.

In the period leading up to the vote in April, the government took measures to restrict civil liberties, including banning protests, arresting opposition leaders, and preventing the Catholic Church from deploying election observers. Foreign journalists were also barred from reporting on the events.

Abdul Majeed Hajj Sibo, a political analyst based in Ghana, told IPS that the reforms are a façade designed to give the illusion of democracy.

“Even the elections that keep bringing Faure back to power are manipulated. This constitutional façade is meant to deceive the Togolese people into believing there is change, but nothing has really changed,” Sibo said.

Faure’s rule is part of a broader trend of “strongman politics” in Africa, argues Sizo Nkala, a Research Fellow at the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg. He notes that, like many other African leaders, Faure has used a combination of patronage, violence, ethnic favoritism, sham elections, and bogus constitutional amendments to stay in power.

“This is a common playbook used by dictators across the continent,” Nkala said.

Nkala posits that while Togo has effectively switched to a parliamentary system, similar to South Africa, the environment in which the elections take place makes all the difference.

“South Africa is a vibrant, multiparty democracy where elections are reasonably free and fair. This is why the African National Congress (ANC), which has governed the country since 1994, lost its majority in the May elections and was forced to form a coalition government with other parties. Moreover, South African legislators do follow their party lines but also enjoy a degree of autonomy. The same cannot be said of the Togolese parliament and electoral process. Elections are rigged frequently, and parliamentarians do not have the latitude to act according to their own convictions. Unlike in South Africa, there is no real separation of powers between the executive and legislature in Togo, which has given rise to the dictatorship and authoritarianism we see today,” he added.

Opposition Under Fire

The opposition in Togo has long faced a harsh political environment. Protests demanding democratic reforms have often been met with government crackdowns. After Eyadéma’s death in 2005, Faure’s rise to power was met with mass protests that led to the deaths of up to 500 people, and many were displaced.

The slogan “Faure Must Go” has become a rallying cry, but government crackdowns have consistently stifled opposition efforts.

“The last thing the Gnassingbé regime will want to see is a formidable opposition outfit; hence it has thrown spanners in the operations of the opposition. This is part of the reason the opposition won only 5 out of the 113 seats in parliament in the April elections,” Nkala told IPS.

He adds: “The Togolese opposition has struggled to mount a unified challenge to the Gnassingbé regime because they work in a very difficult environment where their activists could be subjected to violence, jailed arbitrarily, abducted, or even killed without recourse to justice for merely exercising their constitutional rights of dissent, freedom of association, and speech.”

Analysts also say that cracks and disputes among the Togolese opposition are also a limiting factor.

“The opposition needs to unite and fight as a single bloc, but they have been unable to do so,” Sibo told IPS. Boycotts of elections by opposition factions in the past have only strengthened Gnassingbé’s grip on power, he added.

Kwesi Obeng, a socio-political and inclusive governance expert at the University of Ghana, told IPS that it would be difficult for the opposition to make any headway not just because of its fragmentation but also because a tiny political and economic elite with very close ties to the Gnassingbé family has effectively captured the state of Togo and all its institutions. This dominance over state power and resources, he says, has made it very difficult for any group to break through.

He argued that this situation has resulted in wealth being concentrated in the hands of a few individuals.

“Many people live below the poverty line. In fact half of the Togolese living in rural areas—about 58%—really live in poverty. Additionally, about a quarter of those living in urban areas also live below the poverty line. So, you have a significant portion of the population living precarious lives, with barely any jobs, income, or access to basic services,” Obeng said.

Despite the ruling party’s dominance, the resilience of the opposition shows that there are still those willing to risk their lives for change, Nkala notes, adding that the opposition’s persistence, despite the odds, is a testament to the determination of millions of Togolese people who want to see an end to the Gnassingbé dynasty.

International Response and France’s Role

France has maintained a close relationship with the Gnassingbé family, which has fueled resentment in Togo. After Faure’s re-election in February 2020—an election condemned as rigged by the opposition—France sent him a congratulatory letter, sparking controversy.

Critics, like Sibo, argue that France continues to support the autocratic regime for economic reasons.

Former French President Jacques Chirac once  referred to President Gnassingbé Eyadéma as a “friend to France and a personal friend,” despite the human rights abuses associated with his regime.

Sibo believes this loyalty to the Gnassingbé dynasty has contributed to France’s reluctance to challenge the regime.

“As long as it serves their interests, France will turn a blind eye to the atrocities committed by the Gnassingbé family,” Sibo said.

Obeng agrees with Sibo’s views. “France runs the port, a major contributor to the Togolese GDP, and many major businesses in the country are partly French-owned. Therefore, I think the French government is not interested in unsettling the status quo regarding the governance system and structure in Togo. With Sahelian countries having driven the French out of that part of the continent, France now has very little foothold. As a result, they are reluctant to destabilize a country like Togo, which could potentially join the ranks of nations that have expelled the French from their territory.”

Efforts by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) to address Togo’s political issues have been limited. ECOWAS’s failure to act on the situation in Togo damages its reputation as a leader in promoting regional stability and development, analysts say.

In 2015, ECOWAS attempted to introduce a two-term presidential limit across its member states, but this was blocked by Togo and Gambia.

Experts like Nkala are of the opinion that these organizations lack the legal authority to intervene effectively and that reforms are needed to give them real powers to enforce democratic protocols in member states.

Concerns are mounting over President Faure Gnassingbé’s role in the US-Africa Business Summit. Observers have pointed out that Western nations and organizations often do not authentically champion democracy in Africa. Critics claim these entities tend to prioritize their own agendas, often siding with questionable governments instead.

The Way Forward

With Faure’s party holding a strong majority in parliament, it seems unlikely that the regime will fall anytime soon, critics told IPS.

Nkala believes that unless Gnassingbé loses control of the military or faces a significant challenge from within his own party, political change is unlikely in the near future.

“The military is key to Faure’s power, and as long as they remain loyal, he will continue to rule Togo,” Nkala said.

Obeng says that as long as the elite continue to control the state machinery, including organizing elections, it will be very difficult for the opposition to unseat the government.

He added: “The opposition has made it clear that the elections were rigged, which is why some members chose not to participate. The Togolese opposition has already published its verdict that the elections were manipulated, and we need to take their charges seriously.”

However, Sibo remains hopeful that with greater unity, the opposition could eventually challenge the regime. “The opposition must focus on building a unified front,” he said. “If they can do that, there is still a chance for change.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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By Ignatius Banda
BULAWAYO, Dec 18 2024 – As the population in African cities grows, governments are struggling to provide sustainable public transport solutions, conditions that have led to gridlock in major business districts.

Projections show rapid growth of urban populations across the continent, and town planners are hard-pressed for time on how new spaces and infrastructure will be created for efficient public transport.

A growing number of cities are expected to hit a population of more than 10 million people by 2035, but social services are failing to match the overload on existing infrastructure, with public transport being one of the major sticking points.

In countries such as Zimbabwe, where government-owned transport utilities have been overtaken by thousands of illegal taxi operators, local authorities are fighting an uphill battle to bring order out of the urban chaos.

In the country’s two major cities, Harare and Bulawayo, municipalities have put in place measures to decongest the public transport sector, but these have fallen flat as both registered and unregistered operators have routinely ignored the decrees to work from designated points.

For example, in 2015, the city of Bulawayo awarded a multimillion-dollar contract for the construction of what was hoped to be a futuristic public transport terminus, but operators have shunned it, claiming its positioning in the central business district is bad for business.

While the Egodini Mall Taxi Rank and Informal Traders Market was also expected to provide trading space for vendors in anticipation of business from travelers, it is marked by empty vending bays, with traders preferring crowded CBD sidewalks instead.

City mayor David Coltart has conceded that the project risks becoming a white elephant, and construction of the next phase of the project has been halted to deal with these challenges, highlighting the challenge growing cities face in their efforts to modernise amenities.

Zimbabwe’s public transport headaches come against the backdrop of the Second World Sustainable Transport Day this November, where policymakers and agencies rethink urban mobility.

Other pertinent issues include ways of incorporating public transport into the broader improvement of “safety and security, reducing pollution and CO2 emissions while increasing the attractiveness of urban environments,” according to a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) briefing during the 2023 World Sustainable Transport Day.

According to UN Habitat, the day was declared by the UN General Assembly “in recognition of the important role of safe, affordable, accessible, and sustainable transport systems for all in supporting sustainable economic growth, improving the social welfare of people, and enhancing international cooperation and trade among countries.”

However, to achieve this, UNECA says African governments must put in place “remedial measures” that will ensure the continent’s transportation systems are more sustainable and environmentally friendly.

“African governments must prioritize inclusive urban planning,” said Atkeyelsh Persson, chief of the Urbanization and Development Section at the Economic Commission for Africa.

“Key areas of focus should include upgrading infrastructure such as roads and utilities,” Persson told IPS.

This comes as Zimbabwe and other regional countries seem to be going backwards in realising UNECA’s goals as they are struggling to cope with rapid urbanisation and provide sustainable urban transport solutions for city dwellers.

During last year’s inaugural World Sustainable Transport Day, UNECA said the continent was in urgent need of developing sustainable and resilient public transport infrastructure if Africa is to “optimise the development of interconnected highways, railways, waterways, and airways.”

The agency noted that Africa’s rapid urbanisation was also a call to escalate sustainable urban transport solutions, but with government cuts in public spending and also the drying up of private investors in the sector, public transportation has only deteriorated.

“Despite this growth in urban populations, the rate of growth in housing, infrastructure, and basic amenities has not kept pace with this urban growth,” said Nyovani Madise, a demographics professor and President of the Union for African Population Studies.

“This has resulted in mushrooming of urban informal settlements, waste and pollution, congestion on the roads and overcrowding,” Madise told IPS.

While UNECA has called for the optimisation of interconnected transportation, Zimbabwe’s once thriving railways has become virtually nonexistent, with the National Railways suspending its passenger train service citing operational challenges.

As part of desperate efforts to deal with the shrinking space for public transport, the Bulawayo municipality is planning to take over parking space at the National Railways of Zimbabwe train station for use as a long-distance bus terminus.

The unusual move was triggered by an increasing number of long-distance buses in Bulawayo who have joined smaller pirate taxis picking up passengers in undesignated points.

These developments have further highlighted the difficulties some African countries face in balancing urban population growth and public transport needs, which could be a missed opportunity towards UNECA’s proposed “socially inclusive, environmentally sustainable, and well-governed continent.”

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By Jorge Pastrán
WASHINGTON, Dec 18 2024 – In Venezuela you can no longer say in public that the economic sanctions applied by the United States and other countries are appropriate, or even be suspected of considering any of the authorities illegitimate, because you can be sentenced to up to 30 years in prison and lose all your assets.

In late November, the ruling National Assembly passed the Simon Bolivar Organic Law (of superior rank) against the imperialist blockade and in defence of the Republic, the latest in a regulatory padlock closing civic space, according to human rights organisations.“We see a process of authoritarian learning. When we look at democratic setbacks, we see things that are repeated as patterns, such as the closure of civic space, of civil organisations, of journalism, of democratic political parties”: Carolina Jiménez Sandoval.

The powers of the Venezuelan state thus responded to United States’ and the European Union’s sanctions, and to the protests and denunciations of opponents and American and European governments, to the effect that a gigantic fraud was committed in the presidential election of 28 July this year.

The ruling Nicolás Maduro was proclaimed by the electoral and judicial powers as re-elected president for a third six-year term beginning on 10 January 2025, even though the opposition claims, by showing voting records, that it was their candidate Edmundo González who won, with at least 67% of the vote.

Speaking to IPS, several human rights defenders agreed that the country is following the example of Nicaragua, where laws and measures are driving hundreds of opponents into prison and exile, stripping them of their nationality and property, and suppressing critical voices by shutting down thousands of civil, religious and educational organisations.

“A red line has been crossed and the Nicaraguan path has been taken. Arbitrariness has been put in writing, in black and white, the repressive reality of the Venezuelan state, something even the military despots of the past did not do,” said lawyer Alí Daniels, director of the organisation Acceso a la Justicia, from Caracas.

The law adopted its long name as an indignant response to the US Bolivar Act, an acronym for Banning Operations and Leases with the Illegitimate Venezuelan Authoritarian Regime, designed to block most of that country’s business dealings with Venezuela.

The president of the non-governmental Washington Office on Latin America (Wola), Carolina Jiménez Sandoval, observed that “the closer we get to 10 January, the day when whoever won the 28 July election must be sworn in, we see more and more laws meant to stifling civic space.”

Other laws along these lines include: one to punish behaviour or messages deemed to incite hatred; another “against fascism, neo-fascism and similar expressions”; a reform to promptly elect 30,000 justices of the peace; and a law to control non-governmental organisations.

Demonstration in Caracas demanding respect for human rights. Credit: Civilis

Mere suspicion is enough

The Venezuelan Bolivar act considers that sanctions and other restrictive measures against the country “constitute a crime against humanity”, and lists conduct and actions that put the nation and its population at risk.

These include promoting, requesting or supporting punitive measures by foreign states or corporations, and “disregarding the public powers legitimately established in the Republic, their acts or their authorities.”

Those who have at any time “promoted, instigated, requested, invoked, favoured, supported or participated in the adoption or execution of measures” deemed harmful to the population or the authorities, will be barred from running for elected office for up to 60 years.

Any person who “promotes, instigates, solicits, invokes, favours, facilitates, supports or participates in the adoption or execution of unilateral coercive measures” against the population or the powers in Venezuela will be punished with 25 to 30 years in prison and fines equivalent to between US$100,000 and one million.

In the case of media and digital platforms, the punishment will be a heavy fine and the closure or denial of permits to operate.

The law highlights the creation of “a register that will include the identification of natural and legal persons, national or foreign, with respect to whom there is good reason to consider that they are involved in any of the actions contrary to the values and inalienable rights of the state.”

This registry is created to “impose restrictive, temporary economic measures of an administrative nature, aimed at mitigating the damage that their actions cause against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its population.”

Daniels tells IPS that “this means that a mere suspicion on the part of an official, with good reason to believe that a sanction is supported, is sufficient for a preventive freezing of a person’s assets, prohibiting them from buying, selling or acting in a money-making business.”

“Without prior trial, by an official’s decision, without knowing where to appeal against the entry in that register, the person is stripped of means of livelihood. Civil death returns,” he added.

Archive image of a national meeting of human rights defenders. Credit: Civicus

Other laws

The “anti-hate law” – without defining what is meant by it – has since 2018 prosecuted protesters, journalists, firefighters, political activists and human rights defenders on charges of directing messages inciting hatred towards the authorities.

This year, the state endowed itself with a law to punish fascism and similar expressions, a broad arc because it considers that “racism, chauvinism, classism, moral conservatism, neoliberalism and misogyny are common features of this stance.”

It has also reformed the justice of the peace law to promote the popular election of 30,000 local judges, under criticism from human rights organisations that see the process as a mechanism for the control of communities by pro-government activists and the promotion of informing on neighbours.

And, while the Bolivar act was being passed, the law on the control of NGOs and similar organisations was published, which NGOs have labelled an “anti-society law”, as it contains provisions that easily nullify their capacity for action and their very existence.

The law establishes a new registry with some 30 requirements, which are difficult for NGOs to meet, but they can only operate if authorised by the government, which can suspend them from operating or sanction them with fines in amounts that in practice are confiscatory.

“I think the application of the Bolívar law is going to be very discretionary, and if Maduro is sworn in again on Jan. 10, civic space will be almost completely closed and the social and democratic leadership will have to work underground,” sociologist Rafael Uzcátegui, director of the Venezuelan Laboratorio de Paz, which operates in Caracas, told IPS.

The president of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, and his wife and vice-president, Rosario Murillo, have taken measures against dissent that are models of authoritarianism in the region. Human rights activists believe that in countries such as Venezuela and El Salvador their strategies and norms are being replicated by those who seek to remain in power indefinitely. Credit: Presidency of Nicaragua

The Nicaraguan path

Daniels also argues that with the Bolívar law, the government “is going back 160 years, when the Venezuelan Constitution after the Federal War (1859-1863) abolished the death penalty and life sentences. A punishment that lasts 60 years in practice is in perpetuity, exceeding the average life expectancy of an adult in Venezuela.”

Along with this, “although without going to the Nicaraguan extreme of stripping the alleged culprits of their nationality, punishments are imposed that can turn people into civilian zombies, driven into exile. As in Nicaragua”.

For Jiménez Sandoval “there are similarities with Nicaragua, a harsh and consolidated case. It has cancelled the legal personality of more than 3,000 organisations, including humanitarian entities, national and international human rights organisations and universities, through the application of very strict laws.”

“In these cases… we see a process of authoritarian learning. When we look at democratic setbacks, we see things that are repeated as patterns, such as the closure of civic space, of civil organisations, of journalism, of democratic political parties,” she told IPS.

To achieve this, “they use different strategies, such as co-opting legislatures to make laws that allow them to imprison and silence those who think differently, to avoid any kind of criticism, because, at the end of the day, the ultimate goal of authoritarianism is to remain in power indefinitely”, concluded Jiménez Sandoval.